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Abstract
Regulated markets and state-owned monopolies characterized the economies of many
Southern European and Latin American territories around the end of the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance. Strikingly, however, investigation into the functioning of cost accounting
in such contexts has been widely neglected in accounting research. In this paper, we
examine the role of early cost systems in regulated markets by focusing on the case of the
soap production and distribution monopoly in the City of Seville (Spain). In 1423, the King
of Castille granted the soap monopoly to the Duke of Alcalá as a reward for his war
achievements, but the decision on the price of soap rested in the hands of the local
government. Disputes between the Duke of Alcalá and the local government (the parties)
about the fair price of a pound of soap were resolved through tests that replicated the soap
production process and determined its cost through complex calculations. Drawing on the
insights of institutional sociology, we found that the test and its accompanying cost
calculations constituted an institution that legitimized the parties both in the public opinion
and before the King. Further, our data revealed that the parties engaged in active agency
before the King of Spain to shape in their favor the constitutive elements of the institution,
such as the use of purpose-purchased or stored materials in the soap test; incorporation into
the total cost the rents that would have been earned if the factory buildings were leased; and
the salaries of some employees (i.e., slaves, factory administrator and priest).
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Abstract
Regulated markets and state-owned monopolies characterized the economies of
many Southern European and Latin American territories around the end of the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Strikingly, however, investigation into the
functioning of cost accounting in such contexts has been widely neglected in
accounting research. In this paper, we examine the role of early cost systems in
regulated markets by focusing on the case of the soap production and
distribution monopoly in the City of Seville (Spain). In 1423, the King of Castille
granted the soap monopoly to the Duke of Alcalá as a reward for his war
achievements, but the decision on the price of soap rested in the hands of the
local government. Disputes between the Duke of Alcalá and the local
government (the parties) about the fair price of a pound of soap were resolved
through tests that replicated the soap production process and determined its
cost through complex calculations. Drawing on the insights of institutional
sociology, we found that the test and its accompanying cost calculations
constituted an institution that legitimized the parties both in the public opinion
and before the King. Further, our data revealed that the parties engaged in
active agency before the King of Spain to shape in their favor the constitutive
elements of the institution, such as the use of purpose-purchased or stored
materials in the soap test; incorporation into the total cost the rents that would
have been earned if the factory buildings were leased; and the salaries of some
employees (i.e., slaves, factory administrator and priest).
3Research on 18th and 19th century organizations provided many perceptive
insights into the role of early cost systems in the public sector as well as in firms
operating under monopolistic conditions (Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988;
Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 2002).  Nevertheless, the limited time span of
such investigations, and its concomitant effects on the environments that
witnessed the emergence of cost accounting systems (Meyer, 1986), advised
different strands of historical research in management accounting to maintain that
little is known on the extent to which such systems met the demands of
organizational objectives in varying circumstances (the Economics-Based School:
Boyns and Edwards, 1997b; the Foucaldian School: Hoskin and Macve, 2000). In
particular, valuable perceptions may be gained from investigations addressing
how early cost accounting systems in many Southern European states mediated
the policy of enforcing monopolies and regulated markets in such region and Latin
America during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. At the same time, extant
research showed increasing interest in institutional sociology as a promising,
informing framework for both management accounting (Covaleski and Dirsmith,
1988; Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuel, 1996) and accounting history research
(Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 1998). A study that draws on the contributions
of institutional sociologists to examine the functioning of cost accounting in the
regulated markets of the 16-17th centuries would highlight the intertwinement
between the technical and discursive natures of such systems as well as unfold
their role in public policy. Therefore, such an investigation would contribute to the
overwhelming evidence that examined the functioning of early cost systems in the
competitive contexts that forged many Anglo-Saxon settings in 18-19th centuries
(i.e., U.K.: Boyns and Edwards, 1997a; US: Tyson, 1998; see also Edwards, Boyns
and Anderson, 1995, and Fleischman and Tyson, 1998 for comprehensive reviews).
By addressing the specifics of an interrelationship between accounting and the
state (Miller, 1990), such a study would augment present knowledge about the role
of cost systems in mature, public sector organizations (i.e., 19-20th centuries:
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1995;  Carmona and Macías, 2001). In short, such a paper
might avoid the bias noted by Scott (1995: 146), who stated: “it is difficult, if not
4impossible, to discern the effects of institutions on social structures and behaviors
if all our cases are embedded in the same or very similar contexts.”
Archival evidence supporting this investigation is gathered from the
Royal Soap Factory of Seville (Reales Almonas de Sevilla, RAS)1, a firm that from
1423-18112 enjoyed the royal privilege of being the sole producer and purveyor
of soap to the City of Seville, Spain. Interestingly, however, the royal decree
that granted the monopoly also established that the local government of Seville
should set the soap price. In such circumstances, the RAS and the local
government (the parties, hereafter) became enmeshed in disputes about the fair
price of soap. These disputes were resolved through ad-hoc tests that replicated
the production process of soap and aimed at tracking its manufacturing and
administrative costs through complex calculations. Our investigation draws on
primary evidence about the tests that occurred in the 16th and 17th centuries as
well as on the extensive correspondence that was forwarded by the RAS, the
local government of Seville, and the Royal House.
This article may be of interest for several reasons. First, we approach the
environmental circumstances that witnessed the functioning of cost accounting
in a setting (i.e., early regulated markets in Southern Europe) and a time period
(i.e., 16-17th centuries) that has been widely neglected by accounting historians.
By doing this, we expect to enhance understanding about the technical and
discursive natures of cost calculations as well as the role of cost accounting
systems in enforcing public policy at the outset of regulated markets. In
particular, we aim at elucidating the role of cost accounting in the long-term
survival of a monopoly that was originally granted to express the royal
gratitude for war achievements rather than to signal recognition for efficient
                                                
1 Archival evidence comes from the Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli, Seccción de Alcalá (Archive of the
Dukedom of Medinaceli, Alcalá Section, ADMSA) and the Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (The
Municipal Archive of Seville, AMS). Both archives are well preserved and provide free access to
researchers. Interestingly, the archives are specialized and keep records that report the
perspective of either the RAS (i.e., ADMSA) or the local government of Seville (i.e., AMS). This
enabled us to crosscheck the consistency and reliability of our data sources. The archives do not
contain information on the overall “financial” accounting system of the RAS and, thus, it is not
possible to determine the firm’s profits during our observation period.
2 The soap monopoly lasted until August 6 th, 1811, when the Spanish Parliament abolished
private monopolies by law.
5management. Second, institutional sociology is regarded as a constitutive
element of mainstream research in organization theory (Scott, 1987; Hall, 1991:
289). Though growing, accounting history research that draws on the insights of
institutional sociology is still sparse (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1995;  Carmona,
Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 1998; Carmona and Macías, 2001). By relying on the
contributions of institutional sociologists, we expect to render visible the role of
cost accounting in the interface of business organizations and the state, an area
that is regarded as particularly “promising” by institutional sociologists
(Meyer, 1986: 355). Third, notably lacking from institutional sociology is explicit
attention to the role of human and organizational agency in the set up and
development of institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Suchman, 1995). As noted by
Carruthers (1995: 324), organizations frequently play an active role in
constructing rationalized myths or shaping how they are applied in particular
instances. Therefore, by focusing on the efforts of the parties to shape
institutions, we also expect to develop an interdisciplinary investigation that
casts light on research issues of both management accounting history and
institutional sociology.
THE FRAMEWORK OF INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY
A central tenet of institutional sociology is that organizational contexts
are “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which
individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and
legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer, 1983: 149). Such rules and requirements are
known as institutions, which in turn are defined as “cognitive, normative, and
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social
behavior” (Scott, 1995: 33). Organizational conformity to institutional pressures
avoid external claims of irrationality and negligible behavior and organizations
which do this garner legitimacy and resources and enhance their life prospects.
As noted by institutional sociologists, “being technically efficient is not the only
path to organizational survival. Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the world,
state, powerful professions, or society at large, is another effective survival
strategy” (Carruthers, 1995: 317). Legitimacy is defined as “the generalized
6perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Deephouse (1996: 1025) identifies two
types of legitimacy:  regulatory endorsement, the acceptance of an organization
by the state agencies that formally regulate it; public endorsement, the
acceptance of an organization by the general public.
Firms deploy active agency in their pursuit of legitimacy (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). As noted by DiMaggio (1988: 15), “recruiting or
creating an environment that can enact their claims is the central task that
institutionalized entrepreneurs face in carrying out a successful
institutionalization project”, and this occurs as an outcome of the considerable
latitude that managers have to manipulate the external environment of firms
(Oliver, 1991). Organizational deployment of legitimacy-building strategies
involves “(a) efforts to conform to the dictates of preexisting audiences within
the organization’s current environment, (b) efforts to select among multiple
environments in pursuit of an audience that will support current practices, and
(c) efforts to manipulate environmental structure by creating new audiences and
new legitimating beliefs” (Suchman, 1995: 587, emphasis in original). A
common characteristic of these strategies is that institutional entrepreneurs
strive to make a case of the technical nature of rules and norms (Scott and
Meyer, 1991: 124), and accordingly, the incorporation of such technical elements
into institutions is an attempt to maintain an appearance of rationality
(Carruthers, 1995: 315).
The development and use of highly technical, even mystical, analytical
tools are seen to engender legitimacy (Dirsmith, 1986: 358; also Meyer, 1986),
and this is the case of cost accounting systems. Such systems, it is argued, are
infused with the appearance of a technical function that is developed by
professionals. Therefore, the accounting craft displays considerable potentials
for motivation and control that make it a legitimating institution, to the extent
that it mediates the mapping between action and values (Richardson, 1987: 341
and 343). In short, as Richardson (1987: 349) notes, accounting fulfills two roles:
7“It is a means by which organizations may signal their rationality and meet the
expectations of society, and it is implicated by which of these values come to be
clarified and codified as social expectations.” Rationality signaling, however,
may be motivated by firms’ attempts to convey an imagery of efficiency to
external constituents instead of an actual deployment of accounting systems
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996). Meyer and Rowan (1977) designate as decoupling
the contrast between actual and apparent behavior.
THE SETTING
In the Medieval Ages, the City of Seville enjoyed a long tradition as high-
quality soap producer (González Moreno, 1975). Such a reputation was
attributed to both the sophisticated soap production technologies introduced by
the Arabs during their occupation of the City from the 8-13th centuries3 and the
quality of the raw materials, especially olive oil and ashes produced in the
Guadalquivir Valley.
It was customary on the part of the Kings of Castille to grant territories
and/or monopolies over economic activities to members of the knighthood and
the Catholic Church who excelled in their services to the Crown, such as those
who helped the Kingdom to reclaim Andalusia from the Arabs during the
Middle Ages. In this tradition, King Enrique II issued a royal decree on May
23rd, 1396, to grant the monopoly of soap production and distribution in the
City of Seville to Archbishop Ruy López-Dávalos (ADMSA. Legajo 55-16). Such
royal privilege was then extended or transferred to other individuals until 1423.
At that time, King Juan II expanded the privilege from the City of Seville to its
entire area of influence and granted it to Admiral Alonso Enríquez, who
simultaneously received the Dukedom of Alcalá (ADMSA. Legajos 55-17 and 57-
7). In this manner, the King expressed gratitude to the Duke for his war
achievements. Importantly, the monopoly on soap production and distribution
also encompassed some of its raw materials (i.e., ashes), as stated by King
Enrique IV in a royal decree enacted in 1456 (ADMSA. Legajo 56-2):
                                                
3 The influence of the Arabs on the soap business is illustrated by the adoption in ancient
Spanish of the Arabic word that designated a soap factory, Almona.
8“ … No one but the recipients of my royal privilege shall ever dare to
produce ashes to make soap, with the exception of their employees, those
having signed with them a lease contract as well as those having obtained
their consent …”
Further, the Dukedom of Alcalá deployed an active policy of
acquisition of olive trees and ashes farms during the 15-17th centuries that
aimed at ensuring the supply of raw materials to the RAS and deter
smuggling (González Moreno, 1975). Concerning the latter, our searches
in the archives showed that the Dukedom of Alcalá filed lawsuits against
soap smugglers extensively, regardless of the marginal significance of the
illegal trade (ADMSA. Legajos 50-26, 50-47, 51-28; AMS. Section 1, Litigios,
Folder 107, Number 3).
The RAS were located in an impressive building surrounded by warehouses.
The soap production and distribution processes were run by some 50
employees and were characterized by its tough working conditions. The heat of
soap production added to the usual high humidity and temperatures of Seville
during five months a year (86-104ºF, 30-40ºC), and this posed considerable
difficulties over working conditions: “… only inside the reduced space of the
office of weights and measures it is possible to breathe” (ADMSA. Legajo  50-
19). Interestingly, the shop floor was run by six operators, who used to be
Sevillian slaves, redeeming their misbehaviors by working stays at the RAS
(Franco Silva, 1978; Cires Ordóñez, García Ballesteros and Vilchez Vitienes,
1989).
The royal decree that granted the soap production and distribution
privilege to the Dukedom of Alcalá (ADMSA. Legajos 55-17 and 57-7)
stated that the local government should set the soap price. Price changes
in any of the soap components (i.e., olive oil, ashes) brought about
frequent quarrels between interested parties about the fair price of soap.
As we shall see, such conflicts also involved the Royal House and ended
with the development of an ensaye –a test that replicated the soap
production process and aimed at tracking its corresponding costs.
9The governing conditions of the tests were quite strict. A team of
soap experts, whose names were negotiated by the parties, conducted the
tests. These experts were selected from outside Seville to guarantee their
independence and neutrality. Further, the parties agreed to keep their
contact with the experts up to a minimum to avoid interferences (i.e., the
experts were not allowed to sleep in Seville during the tests). Importantly,
a local judge supervised the tests, while an accounting expert of the
Catholic Church kept cost calculations and wrote a final report (ADMSA.
Legajos  53-19). Tests were normally conducted on Saturdays, and the soap
produced was stored in a sealed room until it was frozen. Once this
occurred, usually on the following Monday, the final product was
weighed and the cost of a pound of soap was determined.
Admittedly, the date of the earliest test remains unclear. However,
our analysis of the extant archival evidence suggests that it took place
sometime during the period 1515-1520. Until 1515, the available evidence
indicates that the soap price was set by the local government, though the
Royal House used to interfere in such decision at the request of the Duke
of Alcalá. A document in the archives indicates that the Council of Seville,
in a meeting held on August 23rd, 1483, allowed the RAS to raise the price
of a pound of soap from 6 to 7 maravedíes, as a consequence of reported
cost increases in its basic components (ADMSA. Legajo  50-5). In 1492, the
local government decreased the soap price from 7 to 5 maravedíes because
of a drop in the price of olive oil, though a royal decree revoked such
decision and set the soap price back to 7 maravedíes (ADMSA. Legajo  50-
13). On August 13th, 1515 the royal house forwarded a decree to the local
government to set the soap price at 6 maravedíes. To sum up, there are no
traces of tests before 1515, and available evidence reveals that the local
government unilaterally set the soap price, though the Royal House
interfered in these decisions. As we shall see, the documents that report
the 1525 test make some vague references to previous, undated tests. In
particular, González Moreno (1975: 92) indicates that a test was held in
10
1520, though he does not provide any further details on its characteristics.
Taking this evidence together, we suggest that the first test was held
sometime in the period of 1515-1520.
THE 1525 TEST
The local government took the initiative for the development of the
January 1525 test, on the basis of a perceived high price of soap (ADMSA. Legajo
51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57). Importantly, materials
used in the test were purpose-purchased, and not taken from the RAS’
inventories, as claimed the Duke of Alcalá. Table 1 shows materials
consumption.
---------- Table 1 to appear about here ----------
The documents in the archives depict the specifics of raw material costs.
The olive oil was purchased at the Postigo del Aceite (Olive Oil Gate) of Seville.
Reported price was the outcome of a weighted average of all olive oil
acquisitions made during the preceding week: “those prices were used and
distributed and each arroba cost 140.5 maravedíes, once the five maravedíes of
alcabala4 were taken into consideration” (ADMSA. Legajo 53-27; see Appendix).
The purchasing cost of a fanega of ashes was 40 maravedíes and 10 more
maravedíes were added to account for transportation and sundry costs. A carga
(load) of wood cost 2 Reales, that is, 68 maravedíes (see Appendix). However, one
tenth of the carga was not used in the test, and this produced a decrease of 7
maravedíes in the final cost (see Appendix). Lastly, the soap experts who ran the
test estimated the cost of lye.
The soap produced weighed 7 arrobas and 11 pounds, that is, 186 pounds
of soap. This implied that one arroba of olive oil produced 62 pounds of soap
and such outcome was regarded as a “high performance of olive oil” (“alto
rendimiento del aceite”). Further, it was admitted “this test has been more
successful than any of the preceding ones”  (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4), as one arroba
of olive oil normally made 50-51 pounds of soap. Although materials used in
                                                
4 Alcabala, a tax sale.
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the production of a pound of soap cost 4.818 maravedíes, difficulties of handling
decimals at the time made the experts consider the cost “4 ½ maravedíes and one
nueva”, that is 4.75 maravedíes, per pound of soap.
The manager of the RAS, however, complained that soap production also
involved other activities, and thus, their accompanying costs had to be added to
those calculated for raw materials. These complaints are gathered in the
memorandum that is summarized in Table 2. Column 1 depicts the RAS
management’s claims about items and prices that had to be incorporated into
the production cost of soap, whereas column 2 reports the reaction, and final
decision, of local government’s representatives.
---------- Table 2 to appear about here ----------
What follows is a description of the rationale employed by the RAS
management as well as some of the counterarguments posed by the local
government:
(i) If leased, the house that hosted the soap factory would have produced
an annual rent of 16,000 maravedíes;
(ii) The wages of the six shop-floor operators should be considered.
Representatives of the local government verified, however, that five out
of the six shop-floor employees were slaves. Therefore, they agreed in
budgeting their living costs, but removed their suggested wages (i.e.,
17,000 maravedíes/year);
(iii) Investments made by the RAS in inventory and machinery would
have fairly produced a 10% annual return, and this made 300,000
maravedíes in the opinion of the RAS management. As shown in Table 2,
this figure was marginally accepted by the local government, which
incorporated 20,000 maravedíes into the soap cost.
Accepted claims amounted to 171,175 maravedíes, which were allocated to
the expected annual production of soap, that is, 417,000 pounds. Non-
production costs, in short, increased the cost per pound by 0.41 maravedíes.
However, the abovementioned problems regarding the handling of decimals
brought about the following consideration: ”… it seems that each pound costs
12
one nueva which is one fourth of maravedí as well as half a nueva, which is one
eight of maravedí …” The resulting figure was rounded down and made 0.25 +
0.125 = 0.375 instead of 0.41, which in absolute terms, meant a difference of
14,900 maravedíes (171,275 – 156,275). The final report of the test stated: “… the
remaining 14,900 maravedíes are for the people [of Seville] because there is no
way to allocate this amount to the pounds [of soap], and ultimately, this
amount is consumed and are consumed [sic] by the people of Seville …”
The experts who carried out the test, however, admitted that this test
witnessed an outstanding performance of olive oil. Under normal conditions,
one arroba of olive oil would have produced 50 or 51 pounds of soap, and if that
had occurred in this test, the cost of a pound of soap would be 6 maravedíes,
instead of the 4.75 maravedíes calculated from the test of January 1525.
Consequently, they proposed to set the soap price at 6 maravedíes and pointed
out that “the test was beneficial for the people of Seville and worth being taken
as a reference for the future.”
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE 1615 TESTS
In 1602, the soap price was set at 18 maravedíes/pound5. The Duke of
Alcalá, however, disagreed with this price and its supporting test and
forwarded a memorandum of complaints to the King (ADMSA. Legajo 53-17).
The Duke argued that the local government did not consider some of the costs
that are instrumental to the processes of soap production and distribution (i.e.,
wages of the salespersons) and that he dismissed the costs of materials’ wastage
and theft from the production costs. As a matter of principle, the Duke
indicated that tests should be carried out with materials taken from the RAS,
and not with those purpose-purchased. The former, he stated, had a lower
quality than the latter to the extent “stored materials are less and less strong as
time goes by … [and] one arroba of olive oil cannot produce 48 to 50 pounds of
                                                
5 The City of Seville was granted the privilege of trade monopoly with Latin-America. As a
consequence of the massive shipments of gold and silver to the City from the Spanish overseas
colonies, inflation soared in Seville during the 16th –17th centuries. This period is known in
economic history as the “high inflation of Seville” (la gran inflación de Sevilla, see Hamilton, 1975;
Morales Padrón, 1977), and this may explain why the price of a pound of soap tripled in 77
years.
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soap because of the bad quality of many [raw] materials, like lye.” The Duke
also reported that a pound of soap was being sold in the range of 20-32
maravedíes in nearby cities, and this made him face considerable financial losses.
The arguments of the Duke appealed to the King, who ordered the
development of a test that was carried out in 1603. On the basis of this test, the
soap price was set at 22 maravedíes. Interestingly, the parties agreed that such
price “shall not change in the future, and thus, no consideration will be made of
increases or decreases in costs of raw materials.” King Felipe III endorsed the
agreement on September 3rd, 1603 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-19).
In 1614, however, changes in the cost of raw materials brought about a
test that showed a cost of 30 maravedíes per pound of soap. The Judge of the
Court of Seville, Mr. Juan del Castillo, stated that raw materials performed
poorly in this test and endorsed the decision of the local government to set the
price at 24 maravedíes/pound. This made the Duke of Alcalá forward a
memorandum of complaints to the Royal Council. He claimed that a
considerable number of items had not been taken into consideration: the
salaries of supervisors and foremen and the “interest of investments in
materials, machinery and real estate”. He asked the Royal Council to enforce
the development of a new test, and meanwhile, set the soap price at 33
maravedíes/pound.
The Royal Council reacted on July 28th, 1614. It ordered the development
of a new test and enforced a temporary soap price of 24 maravedíes/pound.
Although the Duke recognized the willingness of the local government to carry
out the test, he disagreed with its intention to use “highly selected and strong
materials.” In contrast, the Duke claimed that the RAS made purchases “on a
yearly basis”, and therefore, “stored materials could not be as good or as strong
as those purpose-purchased.”
The local government, in turn, claimed that the present price of soap was
very convenient for the Duke. It was argued that the Duke’s correspondence
with the Royal Council contained unbearable claims to cover up his ultimate
14
goal of delaying the development of a new test. Furthermore, the local
government made a point for not using the RAS’ inventories in future tests:
“ … many [of the inventories] were dried and corrupted because they
were purchased for [the Duke’s] convenience. If the test were carried out
with such materials, the soap price would be set at least at forty maravedíes
per pound. The present procedure was backed by tradition and did not
cause any damage to the Duke; thus, none of his claims were justified
because the City was careful to ascertain prices of lye, olive oil and other
materials from verifiable sources. These prices were then incorporated
into the cost of soap in the same manner as it has been done in the long
past …”
The local government supported its contention by attaching the result of a
recent, undated test that determined a unit cost of 15.83 maravedíes/pound.
The soap price, however, was set at 18 maravedíes/pound “to deter further
delays and lawsuits [from the Duke]”.
The Duke, however, disagreed with the procedures that governed
this test and thus forwarded a new memorandum of complaints to the
Royal Council. He claimed that the production and distribution processes
for the soap involved more than fifty people and that the local government
just considered the salaries of as many as twenty employees. The Duke
also argued, “the RAS were housed in a huge building whose
maintenance required annual expenditures of at least 500 ducados and
whose yearly rent, if leased, would have produced 1,000 ducados… [Lastly,
I have made] considerable investments in inventory and machinery.” Such
considerations, the Duke added in his letter, were dismissed by the local
government, which only admitted one fourth of the maintenance costs. In
short, the Duke asked the Royal Council to enforce the incorporation of
these costs into the soap price. He also claimed that tests should
“use inventories from the RAS [in the development of the test] and not pick
up a number of singular and exclusive materials that are easy to use for a
test but are not in the normal running of the RAS. [The latter] required the
supply of huge inventories to avoid materials shortages and equally
15
implied that ashes and lime lessened their strength and died (sic) so that
they produced half the amount of soap that was obtained with purpose-
purchased materials.”
These arguments appealed to the Royal Council. On April 9th, 1615,
it forwarded an order to the local government to set the soap price at 22
maravedíes/pound as well as to conduct two tests. One test to be run with
RAS inventories; the other test to be carried out with purpose-purchased
materials. These tests “should be conducted in the next forty days by
[four] persons experienced in the art of soap production, two [people]
appointed by each side. The results of the tests should be reported to the
Royal Council, which shall make a fair decision.”
This order worried the Duke of Alcalá, who reiterated his point of
the huge purchases made by the RAS to guarantee the regular supply of
soap to the City of Seville; and thus, “there was no justification to carry
out a test with purpose-purchased materials.” He also claimed that the
soap price should be provisionally set at 30 maravedíes/pound, instead of
22 maravedíes.
The local government also disagreed with the order of the Royal
Council of April 9th 1615 (AMS. Section 4,Volume 1, Number 11), and
insisted in its contention that a recent test determined a soap cost of 15.83
maravedíes/pound. Therefore, the local government asked for the
authorization of the Royal Council to execute this price in view of the
“maneuvers of the Duke to delay the test and thus make profits from a
convenient, current price of 24 maravedíes/pound.” Further, it was stated
that the “Duke could manipulate the test by letting the RAS materials
become corrupt and thus cause an insurmountable damage to the City and
its inhabitants.” The local government emphasized that all costs of raw
materials and personnel had been taken into consideration and that the
Duke attempted to include in the soap production costs “the wages of
some slaves who were redeeming their attempts to escape from their
owners and to whom the Duke just provided with food and lodging.”
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On July 3rd, 1615, the Royal Council issued an order that maintained
the conditions stated on the document dated April 9th and appointed Mr.
Juan del Castillo, a judge of the Court of Seville, as supervisor of the two
tests. Such conditions were slightly modified by an order of September
12th, 1615, which also appointed Mr. Pedro Maldonado, a fellow judge of
the Court of Seville, as a co-supervisor of the tests. The judges, in turn,
appointed Mr. Juan Bautista de Herrera, Contador (Accountant) of the
Sacred Church of Seville to keep records of the tests and prepare a final
report (ADMSA. Legajo 53-28; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number
57).
THE 1615 TESTS
The Accountant reported first how materials costs were calculated:
“… purchased materials are priced as shown in the attached certifications.
Materials taken from the RAS are valued at their apparent purchase prices
according to the certifications delivered by management …”
Prices of materials consumed for both tests are summarized in Table 3.
---------- Table 3 to appear about here ----------
For the test undertaken with purpose-purchased materials, we
summarize the clarifications made by the Accountant. First, it was necessary to
buy 12 fanegas of ashes, whose unit cost was 5 Reales/fanega, making a total cost
of 2,040 maravedíes. Transportation costs were 24 Reales, that is 816 maravedíes,
and the resulting amount was charged with 10% tax rate. The total cost of ashes,
therefore, was 3,060 maravedíes and the unit cost was 255 maravedíes/fanega.
Second, the experts acquired 12 fanegas of lime, whose total cost was 510
maravedíes. The final cost of lime was increased by both 51 maravedíes of taxes
and the rent of a horse (153 maravedíes). This made the total cost of lime 1,598
maravedíes. Third, 8 quintales of wood were purchased for both tests, at a cost of
612 maravedíes. Further, transportation costs of wood were 102 maravedíes. This
made a total cost of 714 maravedíes and a unit cost of 89 3/12 maravedíes/quintal.
Consumption of wood for this test was written on the left margin of the paper,
and the following data were provided:
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[Wood] delivered for the test 12 arrobas and 10 pounds
[Wood] returned from the test 5 arrobas and 2 pounds
[Wood] consumed in the test 7 arrobas and 8 pounds
Fifth, 2 fanegas of olive greaves, with a unit price of 102 maravedíes/fanega, were
purchased for both tests, and transportation costs amounted 68 maravedíes.
Overall, this brought the total cost of oil greaves to 272 maravedíes. Again, the
Accountant kept records of the consumption of oil greaves for this test:
[Olive greaves] delivered for the test 12 almudes
[Olive greaves] returned from the test 6   almudes
[Olive greaves] consumed in the test 6   almudes
Sixth, the unit cost of olive oil was determined by calculating the weighted
average of all purchases made during the period October 10th- November 10th,
as shown in certifications requested from the supervisor of the Olive Oil Gate.
Twelve different prices were provided, and this resulted in a total cost of 3,979.5
maravedíes that, after adding the corresponding taxes, made a unit cost of 375
1/12 maravedíes/arroba.
In a similar vein, the test that used materials taken from the RAS
required a number of clarifications by the Accountant, which we summarize as
follows. First, the cost of ashes was determined upon the certification provided
by the accountant of the RAS. Purchasing cost was 5 Reales/fanega plus a 10%
tax rate for the alcabala, which made a unit cost of 187 maravedíes. Second,
information about the cost of lime was gathered from the accounting books of
the RAS, which revealed the purchase of 18 carretadas that cost 25 ½ ducados.
Upon the addition of taxes, the total cost became 28 ducados (10,500 maravedíes),
which in turn made the unit cost of lime 72 11/12 maravedíes/fanega. Third,
wood had the same price for both tests, as noted above. Wood consumption for
this test was recorded as follows:
[Wood] delivered for the test 8 arrobas and 17 pounds
[Wood] returned from the test 5 arrobas and 15 pounds
[Wood] consumed in the test 3 arrobas and 2 pounds
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Fourth, oil greaves were also purchased for both tests and the consumption was
recorded as follows:
[Olive greaves] delivered for the test 12 almudes
[Olive greaves] returned from the test 10 almudes and 2 fourths
[Olive greaves] consumed in the test 1   almud    and 2 fourths
Fifth, certifications issued by the supervisor of the Olive Oil Gate were used to
determine the cost of olive oil. These certifications covered the period of
September 10th - October 10th, 1615. Calculation of the weighted average price of
olive oil made a unit cost of 335 3/12 maravedíes, which in turn resulted in a
total cost of 385.25 maravedíes/arroba, after the inclusion of the corresponding
taxes.
Drawing on these data, the cost of a pound of olive oil was calculated by
both excluding and including the transportation costs in the purpose-purchased
test. The first case resulted in a unit cost of 24.4166 maravedíes, whereas the latter
produced a unit cost of 32.66 maravedíes per pound of olive oil. On the other
hand, the test that used the RAS materials produced a unit cost of 27.66
maravedíes/pound. Interestingly, the latter calculation did not encompass any of
the administration and management costs that constituted a permanent matter
of concern on the part of the RAS. The parties, however, agreed that such costs
amounted 10 million maravedíes/year, which in turn made a soap cost of 37.66
maravedíes. In short, the test run with materials taken from the RAS produced a
soap cost that was 5 maravedíes more expensive than its purpose-purchased
materials counterpart. Our searches in the archives, regrettably, did not provide
any insight into the soap price that was set after the 1615 tests.
THE 1640-1692 PERIOD
In 1640, Mr. Antonio de la Cerda, Duke of Medinaceli6, married the
heiress of the Dukedom of Alcalá and took over the royal privilege to make and
distribute soap to the City of Seville and its area of influence. On January 18th,
1643, the parties agreed to soap prices of 30 maravedíes during the next four
                                                
6 The Dukedom of Medinaceli constituted(s) one of the greatest exemplars of the Spanish
knighthood.
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years and 32 maravedíes during the four following ones. King Felipe IV
endorsed such agreement on November 2nd, 1643 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-38; AMS.
Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15), and was subject to several conditions. First,
such prices were not contingent upon the olive oil price. Second, the soap
market was regulated by a royal privilege, and thus, the soap price would be
revised if changes occurred in the terms of the privilege. Third, quality
conditions for soap (i.e., color, tightness) and olive oil performance (i.e., 52
pounds per arroba of olive oil) were established. Fourth, soap supply would be
provided to 14 shops. The location of the shops was also negotiated, and it
included the different neighborhoods of Seville and its area of influence.
Further, the shops had to be open seven days a week, 24 hours/day. Fifth, trade
at the shops should be restricted to bread, olive oil and coal. Weighting devices
should be cleaned and sealed, and the seal had to be checked by a City
supervisor every four months. Lastly, the soap price should be on permanent
display.
In spite of this agreement, conflicts between the local government and
the Duke of Medinaceli were notorious during the second half of the 17th
century, centered around bitter arguments about the procedures that governed
the tests and determined the soap cost. Regarding this situation, we found an
interesting, internal memorandum issued by the Duke of Medinaceli to the
management of the RAS about insights to be considered during the
development of the tests (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4).
“First, we have to find out the cost of the materials in each of the tests7. We
should calculate and add all the corresponding taxes as well as all costs
legitimated by extant documents.
Second, we have to discover the sources of differences between the two tests,
that is, whether they correspond to taxes or any other item, and all calculations
should be made very clearly and separately.
Third, we have to continually update our accounting books and check if there is
anything left.
                                                
7 He refers to the test that used purpose-purchased materials versus the one that used the
materials from the RAS’ inventories.
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Fourth, the whole process has to be monitored to the letter (a la letra, in detail).
Otherwise, it is impossible to discern the price of the items and the level of
consumption.”
On December 6th, 1672 the King answered the complaints of the Duke
about the non-inclusion of some items in the production cost of soap and
ordered the development of a test that “should comprise all costs and rights so
that the price reflects them all” (ADMSA. Legajo  55-13). However, the local
government did not obey this order on grounds of its right to set the soap price
and establish the governing procedure of the tests.
On May 19th, 1692, the local government held a plenary session to set the
soap price at 28 maravedíes. The Duke of Medinaceli, however, disagreed with
this decision and forwarded a memorandum of complaints to the King
(ADMSA. Legajo 55-4; AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, Number 16). The
memorandum, written in flamboyant style, depicted the errors that took place
during the development of the supporting test. He also argued that most of the
administration costs were not included in the production cost and provided
several examples. Of interest for this paper is the Duke’s complaint about the
non-consideration of the salary of the priest in the soap cost:
“[To guarantee the supply of soap to the City of Seville, the RAS] are obliged to
operate on Sundays. This forces me to provide a Sunday mass service for
foremen and operators because they are naked while running production and
cannot leave the premises in such conditions.”
Also important, the Duke claimed that the local government dismissed
his demands to set “my earnings as a constitutive part of price.” In particular,
he argued:
“[The local government] does not admit any earning to me as a purveyor, as it
has done in the past, and as it is currently done in the cities of Cádiz and Xerez.
Further, it has recognized an additional 8 per cent to prevent the deterioration
of the materials and the stored soap. The contention that spreads throughout
the City is that if such expense is considered, then there will be no allowance for
earnings. This lacks support [because] what is expense is not earnings, and
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earnings cannot be denied to the purveyor. Moreover, the privilege will be
useless if I cannot profit from it.”
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Historical research in management accounting has provided many
perceptive insights on the functioning of early cost systems in competitive
environments but equally neglected the role of cost accounting in early
regulated markets. Importantly, such market conditions dominated many
Southern European and Latin-American economies around the end of the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For example, as far as the City of Seville was
concerned, bricks (AMS. Section 3, Volume 13, Number 15), fish (AMS. Section
4, Volume 29, Number 16), and olive oil (AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number
15)8 were just three examples in the long list of goods that operated under stiff
market regulation. In this study, we examined the case of the soap production
and distribution monopoly in the City of Seville – a monopoly granted by the
King of Castille to the Duke of Alcalá in 1423, only the pricing decision was left
to the local government. We found that the parties (i.e., the Duke of Alcalá and
the local government) designed and implemented a complex system of cost
calculations that invested them with legitimacy before the King and the public
opinion at large. Therefore, the tests and their accompanying cost calculations
became a taken-for-granted institution that helped making the monopoly an
undebatable terrain and, ultimately, enabled its survival for nearly four
centuries. In spite of the objective nature attributed to cost accounting data, the
parties engaged in active agency to shape in their favor the constitutive
elements of the institution, namely: the use of purpose-purchased versus stored
materials; consideration of rents that may be earned by the Duke if the factory
building were leased; interest of the investment in raw materials and
machinery; and salary of personnel (i.e., administrator, slaves, priest).
Discussion from the perspective of institutional sociology
From the standpoint of institutional sociology, our findings suggest
several considerations. First, the tests constituted a “mystical” tool (Dirsmith,
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1986: 358) that aimed at instilling rationality and visibility in the price-setting
decision and, especially, at investing the parties with legitimacy and support
(Scott and Meyer, 1991: 124). In spite of discrepancies between the parties about
the specifics of the tests, their development provided the RAS with regulatory
endorsement from the local government of Seville (Deephouse, 1996: 1025),
which we deem as a crucial support for a firm that operated as the sole supplier
in a market regulated by the local government.
The pursuit of regulatory and public endorsements was regarded as
critical for organizations facing “uncertain or ambiguous purposes” (Covaleski
and Dirsmith, 1988: 3). In the case of the RAS, we observed a tension between
its external commitment as sole supplier of a public service and its hidden,
profit-seeking goal. Whereas the former appealed to the external environment
of the RAS and resulted in rounding down the decimals in the cost accounting
calculations of the 1525 test to benefit the people of Seville, ADMSA. Legajo 51-4;
AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57), the latter could not be openly
claimed by the RAS. We found only one claim that touched upon this notion of
private profit, and it occurred at the end of our observation period. In 1692, the
RAS claimed: “… what is expense is not earning, …, [and] the privilege will be
useless if I [the RAS] cannot profit from it” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4; AMS. Section
4, Volume 1, Number 16). Even at this late date, the Duke admitted a doubtful
acceptance of the public opinion towards his profit-seeking goal: ”… The
contention that spreads the City is that if such expense is considered [provision
for the deterioration of inventory] then there will be no allowance for earnings
…”
Lack of public endorsement may threaten the survival prospects of
organizations operating in regulated markets. Though the environments that
witnessed our observation period were far from present day democracies and
their monitoring mechanisms of regulated markets (i.e., parliamentary
committees, regulatory bodies), the clauses that governed the royal privilege
                                                                                                                                              
8 Regrettably, available archival documents on these regulated items are sparse and not well
preserved.
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were subject to control and change, as shown in the agreement of January 18th,
1643 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 5, Number 15). This
agreement established the soap price for the following eight years and stated
that prices would be revised in the event of changes in the terms of the
monopoly.  Such changes, we suggest, had occurred if management of the
monopoly had upset powerful constituents like the King and the people of
Seville. Interestingly, Sevillians had a long tradition of uprisings against high
prices of basic goods or poor standards of living (Morales Padrón, 1977: 106-
115; Domínguez Ortíz, 1984). For example, in 1521, the neighborhoods of
Omnium Sanctorum lead an uprising of the entire City of Seville in demand of
food. The rebels nearly sacked the city council and succeeded in seizing the
local prison and free its inmates (Morales Padrón, 1977: 114). Also relevant was
the revolt of the Spring of 1652 that protested against the high prices of bread, a
regulated good whose price was not the outcome of a test development (AMS.
Section 3, Volume 13, Number 14; AMS. Section 1, Folder 112, Number 4). The
revolt resulted in the seizure of local prisons and military settlements. In short,
we suggest that such a tradition of civil unrest might have appealed to the
parties and exerted some influence on the management of the monopoly; for
example, by stressing the mystical ritual of the tests and the concomitant
imagery of objectivity that was enshrined in cost calculations. We argue that the
tests rendered feasible the long-term survival of the monopoly by enabling the
public endorsement of the parties by the general public (Deephouse, 1996) and
avoiding claims of mismanagement and high prices.
Regulators also sought to enhance their legitimacy before the state, for
otherwise their posts might have been at stake. Our data reveals that the tests
served legitimating purposes for the local government, which used them to
placate some of the demands of the Crown that echoed complaints of the Duke.
It is revealing, for example, that the local government drew on the results of an
undated test around 1614 to express public disagreement with the royal
decision to set a soap price of 24 maravedíes/pound, insofar as a recent test
determined soap cost to be 15.83 maravedíes/pound (AMS. Section 4, Volume 1,
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Number 11). In a similar vein, the local government refused to implement the
Royal Order of December 6th, 1672, to increase the soap price. It is worth noting
that such dismissals of the royal orders occurred in a non-democratic, Ancient
Regime context.
The legitimating function of the tests was reinforced by their technical
appearance as well as their association with independent professionals
(Richardson, 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988: 6). The tests were conducted
by external experts, supervised by local judges and certified by an independent
accountant of the Catholic Church. Importantly, data incorporated into cost
calculations were certified by either suppliers of raw materials or by the
accounting books of the RAS. The parties supported this technical imagery of
accounting calculations. The Duke, for example, relied on a technical discourse
to channel his complaints against specific elements of the tests. This was shown
by his claim that tests had to use materials taken from the RAS instead of those
purpose-purchased, justified on grounds that the former would provide a fair
depiction of the regular conditions that witnessed the production process of
soap.
Second, our findings reveal that the legitimating effects of the tests
outweighed their intended, economic purposes of price setting (Carruthers,
1995). As we have seen, the price setting decision did not necessarily draw
upon the outcome of the tests. In the 1525 test, for example, the production cost
was 5.125 maravedíes, but the price was set at 6 maravedíes because of the
observed “high performance” of olive oil (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4). In 1614, the
production cost that resulted from the test was 30 maravedíes, though price was
set at 24 maravedíes because of the “poor quality” of the materials (ADMSA.
Legajo 53-19). Further, in the second test conducted in 1614, the soap production
cost was 15.83 maravedíes, but the price was set at 18 maravedíes “to deter further
delays and lawsuits [from the Duke]” (ADMSA. Legajo 53-19). In short, the
ritual of the tests and their imagery of objectivity, cost calculations and reliance
on independent professionals signaled the rationality of the pricing decision to
the main constituents of the parties: the people of Seville and the King (Meyer,
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1986; Richardson, 1987), whereas the final price was largely affected by non-
technical considerations.
Lastly, our findings concur with predictions of institutional sociologists
about the development of active agency by individuals and organizations to
create an environment that can enact their claims.  The Duke enacted the
practice of permanent lobbying before the King to create new legitimating
beliefs (Suchman, 1995). His lobbying efforts encompassed issues of tests
undertaken with materials taken from the RAS as well as consideration of the
items that should be included into the total cost of a pound of soap (i.e., rent
that would be obtained in case of renting the buildings that hosted the RAS,
ADMSA. Legajo 51-4). As noted above, these claims were invested with
technical appearance (Scott and Meyer, 1991: 124; Carruthers, 1995), and this
occurred even in the demand for incorporating the priest’s salary into the
production cost of soap (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4; AMS. Section 4, Volume 1,
Number 16). Interestingly for our purposes is the fact that the latitude exhibited
by the Duke to manipulate the terms of the tests was contingent upon his
political influence in the Royal House (Oliver, 1991). For example, the King’s
support for the inclusion of “…  all costs and rights” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4,
emphasis added) in the cost of soap had to wait until 1672, when the powerful
Dukedom of Medinaceli took over the RAS management. The political influence
of the Dukedom of Medinaceli at that particular time may be signaled by the
appointment of the Duke as Spanish prime minister on February 22nd, 1680.
Paraphrasing Burchell et al (1980: 17), we contend that cost accounting became
a mechanism around which interests were negotiated.
Taken together, our findings indicate that the tests and their
accompanying cost calculations played an instrumental role in the survival of
the King of Spain’s policy of granting monopolies to his warlords as a reward
for their achievements. Our findings also suggest that the Duke deployed a
variety of simultaneous strategies with the overall purpose of enhancing his
financial results (Suchman, 1995). As noted above, the Duke never questioned
the institution of the test itself because it arguably legitimated the pricing
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decision and ultimately protected the RAS from claims of poor efficiency. In
spite of this apparent compliance with tests, the RAS simultaneously deployed
a strategy to manipulate the wider environment of the institution by using the
political influence of the Duke over the Crown to modify the governing
procedures of the tests. In short, this suggests that the Duke clearly engaged in
a strategy that distinguished actual from apparent behavior or, as institutional
theorists would put it, the RAS enmeshed in a planned activity to decouple
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Abernethy and Chua, 1996).
Discussion from the perspective of historical research in management
accounting.
Our findings rely on the quality of the archival evidence, which consisted
of a fairly complete, well-preserved set of documents. Our archival evidence let
us address the development of the tests from both the perspectives of each of
the parties as well as their correspondence with the King. First, our evidence
provides support for the contention that early cost management systems
attempted to turn performance into writing and, by doing this, initiated
practices where targets and results were produced from the past into the future
(Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Ezzamel, 1994, 1997). This is exemplified by the
careful account of tests kept by the accountant of the Catholic Church as well as
by the concluding reminder of the 1515 test, which stated that performance
“was beneficial for the people of Seville and worth being taken as a reference for the
future” (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57;
emphasis added). Further, the Agreement of 1643, between the RAS and the
local government, drew upon an understanding of past, normal result
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15), which were
incorporated into the control procedures of the RAS to assume a performance of
52 pounds of soap per arroba of olive oil.
Second, the parties deployed a complex system of cost calculations that
attached values to objects, or as Ezzamel and Hoskin (forthcoming) would put
it, accounting was used as a creator of value. Cost calculations were
implemented by the RAS, a small-sized firm, which in turn provides support
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for Boyns and Edwards’ (1997:22) contention: “there is no reason why, a priori,
one should expect a link between the development of large-scale business and
that of management accounting.” Admittedly, some cost allocations were quite
straightforward. For example, the costs of raw materials were calculated
through the aggregation of purchase and transportation costs, plus the
corresponding taxes. Other calculations, conversely, involved a deep
understanding of production costing. For example, administration and non-
production costs were allocated to soap cost as a function of the annual
production schedule of the RAS, which in turn required a precise forecasting of
soap demand. Further, the RAS argued that present investments in inventories
and machinery could otherwise earn a 10% interest rate and thus claimed that
this had to be incorporated into the production cost. Similarly, the RAS
vindicated that alternative leasing of the buildings that housed the factory
would provide the Duke with rents that should equally integrate product cost.
Also, as noted above, the parties determined the normal performance of olive
oil, which became a crucial element for proper calculation of the soap cost.  In
short, such calculations depicted the utilization of standards based on
expectations from past results some centuries before the advent of scientific
management (Fleischman and Tyson, 1998: 93).
Taken together, these findings revealed the development of forms of cost
keeping practices that were not double-entry based (Miller and Napier, 1993).
They also signaled the expertise of the RAS in ascertaining the constitutive
elements of product costing and, ultimately, about the notion of firms’ profit.
Such understanding was eloquently framed as a pure, technical discourse that
attempted to persuade the King and the local government about the elements
that should be incorporated into soap production costs (Carruthers, 1995).
Interestingly, however, we observed stability in the cost categories as well as in
the soap production technology used during our period of study.
Third, a debatable issue in historical management accounting research is
the extent to which such data informed managerial decision-making (i.e.,
Hoskin and Macve, 2000). Regrettably, there is no available 16th and 17th
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century evidence for proper comparison purposes. Our findings show that the
RAS did not use cost data from the tests for regular managerial decision
making, with the exception of the overall understanding that an arroba of olive
oil should produce 52 pounds of soap, as shown in the 1643 agreement
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15) and in the 1525
test (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57) . On
the one hand, such results are similar to those found by Boyns and Edwards
(1997a, 1997b), who reported little development of costing information in
management decision making in 19th century UK. On the other hand, such
results depart from those found by Carmona et al. (1997, 2002), who
demonstrated the use of cost data in managerial decision making in the Royal
Tobacco Factory of Seville, in 18th century Spain. Thus, our results also deviate
from those found by Tyson (1998), who reported the use of cost data in business
decision making in early 19th century US textile mills.
Third, our findings have shown no traces of incorporating accounting
into the disciplinary nexus of management practices (Ezzamel, Hoskin and
Macve, 1990), and thus, no shift has been found to extend standards of raw
materials to human performance (Hoskin and Macve, 2000). We contend that
the absence of cost data on human performance might be attributed to the
extensive use of slaves in shop floor operations (ADMSA. Legajo  51-4). Lastly,
we have observed the use of an ample variety of complex cost accounting
techniques during the years of 1525-1615, a time period that has been widely
neglected by management accounting historians. These techniques involved
issues that, expressed in present-day terminology, comprised standards of raw
materials consumption (i.e., olive oil), production capacity (i.e., annual
estimation of the RAS turnover), calculation of wastage (i.e., raw materials in
the tests), and opportunity costs (i.e., factory building and investment in
inventory and machinery). It is insightful that such sophisticated techniques
were in use at a time in which it was not possible to handle the decimals.
Extensions
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As noted by some commentators (i.e., Hoskin and Macve, 2000; Carmona
and Macías, 2001), cost accounting practices mediate the undertakings of public
sector agencies as well as the interface between the state and private sectors.
Many Southern European and Latin American territories during the 16th-19th
centuries exemplified an overriding presence of the state in the economy, and
thus, such contexts are also relevant to the study of the circumstances that
witnessed the emergence of cost systems. In particular, we think that a
promising research area is the historical examination of the state’s efforts to
stress the imagery of objectivity of cost data to garner public endorsement.
Similarly, investigation of the extent to which cost systems mediated the
relationship between the state and some powerful constituents (i.e., the
knighthood, the Catholic Church) may enhance understanding of the reasons
that motivated the deployment and use of cost data in varying settings. Lastly,
investigation of cost accounting practices in the price setting decision in
present-day, deregulated markets (i.e., US energy) and privatized sectors (i.e.,
the UK water supply, from 1989) may also highlight the intertwinement
between the technical and the discursive natures of management accounting
systems.
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Table 1:
The 1525 Test:
Cost of raw materials
Materials Consumption Unit cost Total cost
Olive oil 3 arrobas 140.5 maravedíes 421.5 maravedíes
Ashes 6 fanegas 50 maravedíes 300 maravedíes
Lime 2 ½ fanegas 39 maravedíes 97,5 maravedíes
Wood 1 carga 68 maravedíes 61 maravedíes
Lye 6 cuartillos 2,5 maravedíes 15 maravedíes
Total cost 895 maravedíes
Table 2
The 1525 Test:
Other costs.
Items Proposal made by the
administrator of the
RAS
Decision made by the
local government of
Seville
Repair and maintenance of cauldrons.
Purchasing of ropes and related items
12,000 8,000
Preparation of cauldrons for the test 6,000 4,000
Fabrication of sundry materials 10,000 6,000
Taxes for ashes 7,500 7,275
Rent that would be obtained if the building
hosting the RAS were leased
16,000 10,000
Wages and food for the lady in charge of
the office of weights
6,000 6,000
Food and wages for the six operators of the
shop floor
57,000 40,000
Yearly taxes for soap turnover 120,000 40,000
Returns for investments in materials and
machinery
300,000 20,000
Salary of the administrator 40,000 30,000
TOTAL 171,275
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Table 3
The 1615 Tests:
Cost of Raw Materials.
Raw
Materials
Test made with purpose purchased
materials
Test made with materials taken from the
RAS
Consumption Unit Cost Total Cost Consumption Unit Cost Total Cost
Lime 2 fanegas 133.166
maravedíes
266.33
maravedíes
2 fanegas 72.9166
maravedíes
145.833
maravedíes
Ashes 3.5 fanegas 255
maravedíes
892.5
maravedíes
3.5 fanegas 187
maravedíes
654.5
maravedíes
Wood 7 arrobas and
8 pounds
98.25
maravedíes
163.33
maravedíes
3 arrobas and
2 pounds
89.25
maravedíes
68.7225
maravedíes
Olive
Greaves
0.5 fanegas 136
maravedíes
68
maravedíes
1.5 almud 136
maravedíes
17 maravedíes
Olive oil 1 arroba 375.083333
maravedíes
375.083333
maravedíes
0.78125
arrobas
386.25
maravedíes
301.75
maravedíes
Lye --- --- --- 0.140625
arrobas
40
maravedíes
5.
625maravedíes
TOTAL 1,765.25
maravedíes
1,193.43
maravedíes
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APPENDIX
Measures to weight merchandise:
Quintal Arroba Pound Cuartillo
1 4 100 128
1 25 32
1 1.28
1
Monetary (i.e., real, blanca, nueva) and account units (i.e., ducado, maravedí):
Ducado Real Maravedí Blanca Nueva
1 11 375 748 1,496
1 34 68 136
1 2 4
1 2
1
Measures to weight liquids, crops and rough materials (i.e., wood):
Carretada = Carga Fanega Almud
1 8 96
1 12
1
